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FOREWORD
Since President Felipe Calderon took office in December 2006, Mexico has embarked upon the implementation of a culture of law and security that has triggered
a war with organized crime. This war has involved all
sectors of society and has activated a series of renovations in its armed forces, which to date remain the most
trusted institutions in Mexican society.
This groundbreaking Letort Paper is an important
contribution to an understanding of the structure, culture, motivators, and challenges of the Mexican military in the 21st century. Mr. Iñigo Guevara Moyano, a
Mexican researcher and writer, provides a clear picture
of doctrinal and structural transformations, adaptations,
and improvement that the Mexican armed forces have
endured over the past 5 years. Mr. Moyano focuses on
how the counternarcotic role has impacted its organization, deployments, and operations, and how it has generated new doctrinal and equipment requirements. The
paper also addresses key areas of national and international concern such as respect for human rights and and
the military justice system.
Given Mexico’s importance to the United States as
its neighbor, ally, and third largest trading partner, understanding the transformation that its armed forces are
enduring to assist in the implementation of a culture of
law should be of prime concern to all actors—government, private sector, and academia—involved in the decisionmaking process.
		
		
		
		

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Mexico’s armed forces are in the midst of a transformation to better perform in an ongoing war against
organized crime. Their role and visibility have escalated considerably since President Felipe Calderon assumed office in December of 2006.
Although the fight against organized crime is
clearly a law enforcement matter, the absence of effective and accountable police forces has meant that the
Army, Navy, and Air Force have been used as supplementary forces to defend the civilian population and
enforce the rule of law. While the federal government
has striven to stand up a capable police force in order to relieve and eventually replace the military, that
possibility is still distant. Five years into the Calderon
administration, the armed forces continue to be the
main implementers of the National Security policy,
aimed at employing the use of force to disrupt the
operational capacity of organized crime. Their strong
institutional tradition, professionalism, submission to
political control, and history of interaction with the
population mainly through disaster relief efforts have
made them the most trusted institution in Mexican society.
Mexico’s armed forces have long been used as
an instrument of the state to implement all kinds of
public policies at the national level, from emergency
vaccinations, to post-earthquake rescue, to reforestation campaigns. They have been at the forefront of
disaster relief operations in reaction to the calamities
of nature, within and beyond their borders, with humanitarian assistance deployments to Indonesia, the
United States, Haiti, and Central America among the
most recent.
vii

The Mexican armed forces are quite unique, as they
are divided into two separate cabinet-level ministries:
the Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional (the Secretary
of National Defense or SEDENA), which encompasses
the Army and Air Force, and the Secretaría de Marina (the Secretary of the Navy or SEMAR), which
comprises the Navy. The level of engagement with
society and the results obtained from this division in
military power confirms the utility of their independence. Their use as the state’s last line of defense has
led to severe criticism from opinion leaders, opposition forces, international analysts, and human rights
organizations. Their level of commitment remains unaltered and they have undertaken a number of significant transformations to better address their continued
roles as the guardians of the State and protectors of
the population.
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ADAPTING, TRANSFORMING, AND
MODERNIZING UNDER FIRE:
THE MEXICAN MILITARY 2006-11
Despite considerable attention to and investment
in Mexico’s law enforcement sector during the past 5
years, the armed forces continue to be the only Mexican institutions with the capabilities to conduct nationwide operations and the main implementers of
the government’s security policy. This paper analyzes
how the counterdrug role has influenced, and in some
cases directed, its modernization. It also addresses the
main challenges the counterdrug role is associated
with, including human rights concerns, and proposes
some options for its future.
The Mexican Defense Structure: Roles and
Missions.
The fight between state and nonstate groups has
characterized warfare in the 21st century; nonstate
groups include a wide assortment of terrorists, insurgents, pirates, and criminals. Theaters of operation are
as varied as the enemy, ranging from the jungles of
Colombia to the mountains of Afghanistan, the coast
off Somalia to cyber-space. Urban and suburban settings have generally experienced rapid growth and,
with it, the need for governments to provide sufficient
services and execute the rule of law.
This variety of threats poses a challenge for security forces, which are generally underfunded and
consequently find it difficult to stay ahead of their
rapidly evolving enemies. Lack of appropriate police
and justice systems generally leads to power vacuums
where crime develops. Old and new democracies have
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turned to their largely cold war militaries to face these
new adversaries and, in some cases, provide the only
visible presence of the state. Hence, democracies are
faced with the problem of not having the appropriate
forces to deal with the problem, which in some cases
requires good judges and social workers rather than
soldiers.
Since the administration of Felipe Calderon assumed office in December 2006, the Mexican armed
forces have been the main implementing agents of the
country’s national security policy, which identifies
organized crime, drug trade organizations, and arms
trafficking as its priority targets.1 Mexico possesses
a sui generis defense establishment composed of two
independent institutions: the Ministry of National
Defense (SEDENA), which includes the Army and the
Air Force (FAM); and the Marine Ministry (SEMAR),
comprised of the Navy (ARM), including its general
fleet, naval air force, and marine infantry corps. This
unique style of organization dates back to 1940, when
the Department of the Navy was established as an autonomous entity separate from the Ministry of War. In
1941 the Navy Department received full cabinet ministry status in order to provide it with financial and
operational independence to implement the country’s
maritime policy.2 The FAM, however, continued to be
subordinated to the Army-controlled Ministry of War,
which assumed the name of the National Defense
Ministry.
The three armed forces are assigned the mission of
preserving national security, defined by the Mexican
Constitution as defense from external enemies and
internal threats.3 Thus, unlike other armed forces in
the hemisphere that are legally barred from projecting
power internally, the Mexican Constitution explicitly
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mandates it. Deployment outside of its borders during peacetime, even to participate in international exercises, requires congressional approval.
The chain of command is simple: the President is
commander in chief and has direct control over the
armed forces via SEDENA and SEMAR. Each ministry is headed by an active duty four-star general-secretary and admiral-secretary, respectively; the FAM is
headed by a three-star general who reports directly to
the SEDENA general-secretary.
Both ministries’ functions and responsibilities are
regulated by the Federal Public Administration Organic Law,4 with each service having its own organic
laws that further specify its roles and missions5 which
are additional to those traditional missions growing
out of Mexico’s historical and geo-political situation.
In general terms, they comprise the defense of the
country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, internal security from destabilizing forces, and disaster relief assistance to the population. The Mexican armed
forces therefore carry out roles that in other countries
are assigned to a variety of civilian agencies and intermediate forces, such as national guards, coast guards,
and national police.
There are a number of elite military units, representing all services, directly subordinate to the Office of the President through the Presidential High
Command Staff or Estado Mayor Presidencial (EMP).
These units include a Presidential Guards Corps, a
Marine Infantry Presidential Guard Battalion, and a
Presidential Transport Air Group (GATP).6 The EMP
is responsible for the president’s personal security. It
also acts as a liaison with the military and advises the
president on matters of national security. By law, the
EMP is headed by an Army general.
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Defense Budgeting and Spending.
With the country having no external enemies,
funding for the defense sector has been traditionally
low. When calculated as a proportion of the country’s
gross domestic product (GDP), defense expenditures
average around 0.5 to 0.7 percent. When compared to
other large countries in the hemisphere, Mexico is at
the lower end of defense spending.
In the past 5 years the defense budget (including
pensions and social services) has gone up 100 percent,
but when adjusted for inflation, the real increase has
been only slightly over 50 percent (see Figures 1 and
2). As manpower levels increased only by 4 percent
from 2006 to 2009 (the last published public figure),
most of this increase went to raising salaries and increasing benefits; troops employed in high impact operations received an 80 percent increase between 2006
and 2010. Benefits included the granting of 15,000
housing credits and 35,000 scholarships for military
dependents.7
2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

SEDENA

26,032

32,201

34,861

43,623

43,632

50,039

SEMAR

9,163

10,951

13,383

16,059

15,992

18,270

ISSFAM

2,545

2,729

2,998

3,459

4,542

5,852

37,740

45,881

51,242

63,141

64,166

74,161

Total

2011

Source: Presupuestos de Egresos de la Federacion 2006-2011 published by the Secretaria de Hacienda y Crédito Publico.8

Figure 1. Budgets Assigned to Defense Institutions
in Millions of Mexican Pesos (MXN).
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Nominal Increase %
INPC previous year (PY)
Increase after PY INPC

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

21.6%

11.7%

23.2%

1.6%

15.6%

4.1%

3.8%

6.5%

3.6%

4.3%

17.5%

7.9%

16.7%

-1.9%

11.3%

Source: Elaborated by author based on INPC (inflation) figures consulted in the Banco de Mexico inflation portal on December 30, 2010, data for 2010 is as of November 30.9

Figure 2. Proportional Changes
to the Defense Budget and Inflation.
Interservice Rivalries and the Competition for
Resources.
Despite the administrative division in the services,
which guarantees the individual development of the
naval and land forces, the armed forces are not immune to the normal interservice rivalries that usually
dictate competition for additional resources, especially when it comes to role and mission overlap.
•	In February 2007, the SEMAR Commission in
Congress petitioned the President to transfer
the Army’s five Amphibious Special Forces
Groups (GANFES) to ARM—along with its
financial resources—in order to expand the
Navy’s Marines.10 The petition was not accommodated. GANFES remains under SEDENA
control, with its five groups stationed in Baja
California, Baja California Sur, Sonora, Quintana Roo, and Yucatan, respectively.
•	In June 2007, a SEMAR plan to stand up a total
of 30 marine infantry battalions (BIM) report5

edly caused antagonism within SEDENA sectors that see their traditional areas of operation
co-opted by the Navy’s growing land-based
component. 11
•	Plans by SEMAR to acquire six Sukhoi Su-27 jet
fighters from Russia were cancelled, with the
existence of the plans later denied in an official
SEMAR communiqué in 2007.12 This change
in requirement was attributed to a redesign in
the ARM’s power projection capabilities by the
incoming 2006-12 SEMAR administration. Acquisition of these 4.5 generation fighters would
have put the SEMAR-controlled naval air
force’s (FAN) combat capabilities above those
of the Air Force. The Air Force is equipped with
third generation Northrop F-5E/F Tiger II fighters acquired in 1981.
Despite this obvious competition for resources, the
proportion of the defense budget assigned to each institution has not varied considerably during the past 5
years (see Figure 3).
Proportion

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

SEDENA

69%

70%

68%

69%

68%

67%

SEMAR

24%

24%

26%

25%

25%

25%

ISSFAM

7%

6%

6%

5%

7%

8%

Source: Elaborated by author based on Presupuestos de Egresos
de la Federacion 2006-2011.

Figure 3. Proportional Allocation of
Financial Resources to Defense Institutions.
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Funding for the interservice social security institution ISSFAM, which addresses healthcare, life insurance, and other services for members of the armed
forces and their dependents, has received the largest
increase in real terms. This sort of joint institution is
a good example of the efficiencies obtained from centralizing supporting services.
Evolution of the Army.
The Army is composed of some 200,000 personnel.
The last public document detailing SEDENA personnel composition by ranks shows an 80/20 mix of enlisted and officers, with 537 generals.13
The country is divided into 12 Military Regions
(RM), each subdivided into a variable number of Military Zones (ZM). ZMs are created according to operational requirements; as of December 2010, there were
46 ZMs.14 Each zone has a variable number of units
assigned. As of February 2011, there are 104 infantry
battalions, 24 motorized cavalry regiments, 9 armored
reconnaissance regiments, 8 mechanized regiments,
12 Special Forces battalions, 10 military police battalions, 4 engineer battalions, 1 logistics battalion, 3 airborne rifle battalions, 9 artillery regiments, 8 recoilless
rifle groups, and 25 independent infantry companies
(CINE).15
This type of territorial deployment follows a pattern established in 1924 shortly after the end of the
Mexican revolution and remains the most viable form
of accomplishing the Army’s three main missions.
The strategic rationale for this type of deployment is
the felt need for a “blanket of forces” that provides
a multi-layer defense system against a hypothetically
larger and superior invading force. The forces would
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execute light infantry and guerrilla-type operations
in order to defeat the invader through attrition. The
Army’s presence in every major population center,
and in some of the most remote places in the country,
allows the Army to have a real time power projection
capability to counter an insurrection.
Since most of the second half of the 20th century
was relatively peaceful, Army forces also took on additional responsibilities regarding the population and
the environment. From 1966, the Army began implementing disaster relief operations as part of its mission
portfolio and participated in national vaccination, literacy, nutrition, and reforestation campaigns, which
created a strong bond between the civilian population
and the military. In isolated areas, the Army provided
the only state presence.
Adapting the Land Forces.
As part of the SEDENA 2007-2012 Directive for Integrated Combat against Narco-trafficking, the high command decided to implement the Centralized planning
and decentralized execution scheme, providing region
and zone commanders the operational autonomy
needed in order to conceive, plan, and execute high
impact operations.16 The SEDENA high command also
issued the General Directive for Army Training 20072012, which is designed to identify potential leaders
and develop leadership qualities, as well as to increase
the level of training effectiveness.17 This new training
program is divided into five phases: individual combat, small team, battalion, large unit (brigade level)
combined arms, and large forces air-land joint operations. The last two phases, pertinent to conventional
warfare operations, will not be implemented during
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the current administration, making it clear that there
is no need at the moment for conventional military
training.18 The initial three phases reflect a heavy emphasis on urban operations, establishing roadblocks,
conducting patrols inside and around small towns,
and restoring public law and order.19 These are the
types of operations that the Army has been active in
throughout the country.
Initiatives to create separate, specialized forces
that would focus on the counterdrug role have not
prospered. In May 2007 SEDENA announced the establishment of a 10,000-strong Federal Support Forces
Corps (CFAF) especially trained and equipped to fight
organized crime. This force would be under the direct
orders of the President. The initiative faced strong
opposition in Congress, where its funding for 2008
was cut off amid concerns that it could mutate into
a Praetorian Guard used for political purposes.20 The
initiative was then redrafted and presented in 2009 as
a 5,000-strong force under direct orders of the SEDENA General-Secretary. Mexico’s Congress also turned
thumbs-down on the budget for this initiative.21
The Human Rights Component: Complaints vs.
Violations.
The prospect of military forces operating in urban
settings, especially residential areas, is disturbing to
most citizens in the Western Hemisphere. Although
it is a valid concern, some human rights-oriented
think tanks and advocacy groups have inaccurately
portrayed human rights as being violated by the mere
presence of soldiers in the streets. The news media
have picked up on some of these studies, mostly as
headlines without any sort of analytical depth, but
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propagating the perception that the Mexican Army
was engaged in systematic human rights violations.
This perception stems from the fact that the increase in Army deployments to urban areas since
December 2006 has occurred in tandem with a rise in
complaints filed before the National Human Rights
Center (CNDH). These complaints, however, do not
constitute violations (see Figure 4).
Status

2006 22

2007

2008

2009

2010

Total

Total Filed
Complaints

8

376

1,143

1,644

1,320

4,491

Pending from
processing

-

-

10

32

369

411

Processed

8

376

1,133

1,612

951

4,080

Recommendations
issued by the CNDH

-

7

14

30

22

73

Proportion of
recommendation vs
complaints

0.0%

1.9%

1.2%

1.8%

1.7%

1.6%

Source: Elaborated by author based on SEDENA and CNDH
reports, accessed on January 26, 2011.

Figure 4. Number of Complaints, Status, and
Recommendations.
Over half the complaints filed are not related to
human rights violations; they are related to electoral,
labor, agrarian, environmental, or constitutional interpretation issues (see Figure 5). But by law, all complaints presented at the CNDH have to be filed and
processed.
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Not related to Human Rights Violations

2,347

58%

Lack of evidence of a Human Rights Violation

1,125

28%

Complainant desisted

236

6%

Conciliated (solved)

107

3%

Integrated into existing investigations (repeat or
coincidental complaints)

78

2%

Accepted and transformed into recommendation

73

2%

Complaint was resolved during the process

46

1%

CNDH was not the appropriate agency for the
complaint

33

1%

Complainant lacked interest in pursuing the
complaint

33

1%

2

0%

Sent to the corresponding authority
Processed complaints

4,080 100%

Figure 5. Resolution of Complaints Processed by
CNDH from 2006-10.
Out of the 73 recommendations (on cases that refer to actual human rights violations) issued by the
CNDH, all were accepted by SEDENA as of January
2011. Of these 73 recommendations, 14 are identified
by SEDENA as being of an internal “administrative
nature,”referring to military personnel or their survivors who filed a compliant against SEDENA due to
cases of medical malpractice by military healthcare
personnel. The other 59 recommendations are directly linked to the Army’s operations against organized crime. Of these 59 recommendations, 21 refer
to citizens that reported an abuse of power by Army
personnel, most of them at roadblocks, but where no
physical injury occurred; a further three refer to drivers who failed to stop at Army roadblocks and were
fired upon, one of which was reported to be driving
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while heavily intoxicated. Three more cases relate to
civilians who were killed in cross fires, while the remaining 32 recommendations refer to cases of injury,
disappearance, torture, and homicide caused by military personnel. Military justice personnel reportedly
have investigated 217 of its personnel and as of January 2011, found 39 guilty as charged.
The concept of having civilian courts rule over military-caused abuses is a positive concept when there
is a strong and proven judicial system in place. In the
case of Mexico, that is not currently the situation. The
entire justice system is undergoing what can only be
described as a complete overhaul as it morphs from
an inquisitorial to an accusatorial system. According
to Article 13 of the Mexican Constitution and Articles
57-58 of the Military Code of Justice, the military judicial system has jurisdiction over crimes committed
by active duty military personnel against civilians.
All other cases are handled by the civilian justice
system. 23
With over 200,000 personnel, the Mexican Army
is certainly not immune to the presence of criminal
elements within its ranks. To address this liability,
SEDENA outlined the need for further professionalization through a doctrine that requires strict adherence to human rights and the rule of law; this need
led to the creation in 2008 of the position of General
Director for Human Rights in the SEDENA Command
structure, a milestone that passed relatively unnoticed
by most media and analysts. It is a position designed
to promote and strengthen the practice and protection
of human rights within the Army’s ranks, as SEDENA
envisions continuing internal security operations in
the long term.24
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SEDENA acknowledges that as a consequence of
its actions against organized crime, criminals, and/or
common citizens associated with criminals file false
complaints in order to discredit the armed forces.25
A number of nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) and think tanks have relied on the larger, unprocessed human rights complaint figure to produce
public reports. The repercussion of these reports on
the perception of trust in the armed forces was grave,
but momentary (See Figure 6, Year 2008). Motivation
for these inflammatory reports, beyond a perception
of criminal association, lies in the NGOs’ need to access funding from national and international government grants, foundations, and private individuals.
The U.S.-funded Merida Initiative alone allocated
U.S.$61.5 million in FY 2008-10 to programs involving
organized civil society.26

Source: LAPOP 2010 from Bailey et al., “Army as Police? Correlates of Public Confidence in the Police, Justice System, and the
Military: Mexico in Comparative Context,” January 28, 2011.

Figure 6. Institutional Trust in Mexico 2004-10.
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A Wake Up Call.
As SEDENA modified its doctrine, training, and
deployment to better adapt to long-term internal security operations, it created permanent community liaison offices that would work to minimize the impact
of its operations on society. In June 2010, SEDENA
created the Civil–Military Liaison Unit (UNIVIC),
with the mission to strengthen communication and
foment constructive links between SEDENA and civil
society. It is designed to solve problems and minimize the negative effects of the prolonged presence
of troops in the streets.27 Civilians with experience in
public policy, human rights, and the Culture of Peace
have been invited to form part of this unit. During the
2 months of operations before the SEDENA 2009-10
report was published, UNIVIC resolved five cases
in which people had been adversely affected by the
Army’s presence in the streets. The type of support
provided includes covering funeral expenses, reparations, medical treatment, and psychological therapy
for victims. As of 2010, the trust perception of the military is back on top among Mexican institutions (see
Figure 6, Year 2010).
The Need for Additional Manpower.
Several attempts to reform Mexico’s public security (police) system, which by December 2010 was composed of over 2,040 police departments and 447,922
personnel at the municipal, state, and federal levels,
have not progressed. The 2010 initiative to create 32
state police forces that would absorb the roles and
functions of the municipal forces, creating more resilient, accountable, and efficient forces, was held up in
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Congress, with debate delayed until the first term of
2011. Even with this large police enforcement reform
in place, the Unified Police Command will face an
enormous challenge of acquiring credible capabilities
over the next few years. Its focus will be on general
public crime, rather than organized crime.
The Federal Police has grown from 6,500 agents
in December 2006 to 35,500 by December 2010,28 but
still lacks the technical capability, infrastructure, and
numbers to provide a permanent nation-wide presence. Expanding it continues to be a priority, but expansion needs to be performed at a slower pace; training professional police officers should not be rushed.
The Army remains the only institution with the infrastructure and capabilities to stabilize large regions
that come under intense criminal cartel violence. As
the violence expands or shifts, additional forces are
needed to secure areas where the state has historically
neglected to establish its presence. Army troops cannot substitute for police in conducting day-to-day law
enforcement activities, but they can provide security
umbrellas in towns that are under siege by gangs of
armed men. Latin American countries that use their
armed forces for similar internal security, infrastructure protection, and national development roles have
forces—military and paramilitary—that proportionately far exceed those of Mexico (See Figure 7).
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Colombia

Venezuela

43,677,372

26,814,843

Military

285,220

163,000

46,100

114,000

267,506

Paramilitary

144,097

36,000

37,100

77,000

36,400

Total Security
Forces

429,317

199,000

83,200

191,000

303,906

Military per 100K

653.0

607.9

471.6

385.8

240.5

Intermediate
Forces per 100K

329.9

134.3

379.5

260.6

32.7

SF per 100K

982.9

742.1

851.1

646.4

273.3

Population

Bolivia

Peru

Mexico

9,775,246 29,546,963 111,211,789

Source: elaborated by author based on figures in IISS The Military Balance 2010, the International Institute for Strategic Studies;
Venezuelan figures are based on the author’s research from official Venezuelan sources.

Figure 7. Population, Active Military, and
Paramilitary Forces, 2010.
Raising forces to a level comparable to that of these
countries would need to see the Mexican military expand by a number in the range of 160,000-460,000,
with the bulk of it destined for the Army. Intermediate
forces would also need to be expanded in the 110,000330,000 range.
Tackling Desertion.
Desertion in the Army has long been an issue.
From 2000 to 2005, a total of 106,814 members of the
Army deserted (17,802 per year on average).29 Retaining skilled troops became a priority for the new administration, and President Calderon announced in
February 2007 that pay would increase by 46 percent
for enlisted personnel.30 Additionally, recruiters began
in 2008 to refine their promotion criteria, launching a
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program to identify and promote leadership qualities
among the ranks. In February 2009, President Calderon announced another 40 percent budget increase for
enlisted personnel to be applied to pay and benefits.31
As part of a morale-boosting effort, SEDENA reinstated a directive providing military honors for troops
killed in high impact operations, consisting of a 21gun salute burial, military band, and memorial flag,
accompanied by a life pension for their dependents.
The programs had an immediate beneficial effect on
the number of desertions recorded from 2008 (see Figure 8).
Desertions

2006

2007

16,405

16,641

2008
9,112

2009
6,879

2010
2,986

Source: SEDENA Response to a Federal Institute of Access to
Information (IFAI) information request, file 0000700020310, and
October 2010, p. 7.

Figure 8. Number of SEDENA desertions recorded
2006-10.32
Conscription Not a Viable Option.
The objective of the National Military Service
(Servicio Militar Nacional, or SMN) is twofold: first,
to develop values and virtues to strengthen the selfidentify of the conscripts as Mexicans; and second, to
form a cadre of reserves that are trained and available
to satisfy the mobilization requirements in case of external war or the serious disruption of public peace
and internal order.33 During the summer of 2009, the
Army launched a pilot program using 330 conscripts
to perform drug eradication duties in Michoacán. The
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unit was led by active duty officers, and conscripts
were equipped and armed to the same standards as
professional troops. They received a stipend equaling
that of a private’s pay for the duration of their service.
Once their tour was finished, they were excused from
the year-long weekend drills. They eradicated illegal
crops of 190 plantations from June 26 to July 28, 2009,
and then went on to participate in a program in which
they toured several public schools, sharing their experiences over the summer and promoting a culture of
lawfulness.34
Provisional military service in Mexico is compulsory for all males that turn 18. They must all register
for service, but only about 10 percent of the total have
to take the program itself, consisting of Saturday-only
drills, literacy campaigns, and public works. Females
may volunteer to participate in the program; their participation has increased from 1,856 volunteers in 2008
to 4,152 in 2009.
In case of a mobilization, conscripts would reinforce battalions and regiments by 300 personnel each,
and CINE and artillery groups by 100 each. In 2010
the number of conscripts inducted for the weekend
program was 83,192 from a possible total of 835,440.35
However, modifying the terms of service to embrace
genuine full-time conscription is not an option, as it
would lead to high desertion rates and likely pose a
negative impact on society. Army recruitment continues to be directed at potential candidates for a military
career.
In October 2010, the SEDENA Commission in
Congress promoted an initiative to fund the creation
of 10,000 new slots that would allow for the establishment of 18 new infantry battalions.36 These new battalions, to be created from the expansion of CINE, would
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be fully operational by the end of 2011. The requested
MXN 13 billion pesos (U.S.$1.08 billion) was turned
down by Congress when it approved the 2011 budget
in December 2010.37 As of March 2011, the expansion
initiative continued to be debated by members of the
National Defense Commission in Congress.
The Combat Inventory.
Conventional capabilities are very limited compared to other forces in Latin America. Since 2004, the
Army has not acquired a single piece of military hardware considered to be within the conventional arms
category.38
Armor holdings include 985 vehicles, most of them
obsolete. Some 28 percent of them were built in the
1980s, another 15 percent were built in the 1970s, and
the rest were built in the 1940s to 1960s. Since the
late 1990s, there has been a modernization effort in
place based on standardizing key components, such
as weapons and engines, in order to streamline maintenance and logistics. This program has resulted in a
number of 1950s and 1960s vehicles, such as the M8
Greyhound armored car and the AMX-VCI mechanized infantry vehicle, being almost completely rebuilt and redesigned. Local production of soft skinned
vehicles known as the DN-series, which took place
during the 1980s with the participation of local vehicle
manufacturer DINA and the Army’s military industries, has not resumed.
There are no heavy or medium artillery pieces in
service. Artillery regiments are equipped with M101,
M2A1, M3, and Italian OTO Melara M56 pack howitzers. The last known acquisition of artillery took place
in 2004, when 13 NORINCO M90 105 mm howitzers
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were procured from China. Being a predominantly infantry force, the Army assures that mortar assets are
abundant, including some developed indigenously in
the 60 mm and 120 mm range. There are only a handful of anti-tank missiles of an early generation (Milan
wire-guided), and the Army has no organic air defense capability.
The Army is equipped only for low-intensity
conflict, for which infantry weapons have assumed
overriding importance in the past decade. The SEDENA-run Military Factories in Mexico City produced
the Heckler und Koch family of small arms and light
weapons under license, and have begun production
of an indigenous assault rifle—the FX-05 Xiuhcóatl, a
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) standard
5.56 mm assault rifle especially designed by the Military Factories. SEDENA is transitioning from the 7.62
mm G-3 to the smaller and more efficient caliber.
Unit-level communication systems were also in
need of replacement by 2009, with close to 90 percent
of the Army’s radio communication equipment considered obsolete.39 The Army began receiving a new
generation of Harris Falcon II radios starting in 2008.
Other major procurement programs during the past
4 years have centered on the establishment of a complete Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
(C4ISR) network, linking Military Regions, Military
Zones, and units down to battalion level.
Anti-Narco Influence on Procurement.
The most representative example of how the antinarcotic role has influenced Mexican military procurement is the 2008 decision to acquire 4x4 pickup trucks
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over a 2006 stated requirement for 1,000 High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles (aka Humvees
[HMMWVs] or Hummers). Under [program
9071100001] the Acquisition of Light Vehicles for Personnel Transport, the Army sought 1,640 4x4 pickup trucks
and 360 double cab 4x4 pickup trucks in order to provide operational units with vehicles that have the adequate
speed and characteristics for operations in support of public
security forces against organized crime within the national
territory.40 General Motors was the selected supplier,
and the 2,000 pickup trucks were upgraded by the Army’s workshops by adding a roll bar, reinforced bumper, hooks, and armament bed to make them suitable
for military urban operations.
HMMWVs were still being acquired, but in
smaller quantities; in 2009 the Army received 254
HMMWVs, and in February 2010 it ordered another
200.41 In February 2011, the Mexican Army announced
that it would begin assembling the Oshkosh SandCat
protected patrol vehicle at its Military Factories. The
SandCat is part of a new generation of 4x4 vehicles designed for the 21st century battlefield, with additional
armor protection for its crew and the speed and agility of a truck. It is based on a commercial Ford F-550
chassis and is classed in the Protected Patrol Vehicle
(PPV) category.
While pickup trucks, Humvees, and new PPVs
provide land mobility, the Army is implementing
new technology to help its troops detect the presence of illegal substances, be they drugs, explosives,
or weapons, through nonintrusive detection systems.
As of February 2011, the Army operated 739 GT-20018 Buster contraband detector kits and 43 GE Mobile
Trace devices used to detect drugs and other illicit
contraband, primarily onboard commercial containers
and vehicles.42
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A final example is the MXN 1.7 billion (U.S.$140
million) program to build 13 Strategic Control Posts
(PPCCEE) designed to inspect vehicles to detect narcotics, weapons, and other illegal goods. The PPCCEEs
will be located in Baja California, Chihuahua, Nuevo
Leon, Oaxaca, Sinaloa, Sonora, and Tamaulipas.43
The Mexican Air Force Command.
The FAM headquarters is located across the street
from the SEDENA building in Mexico City; in 2006
FAM was a very centralized service with about 35 percent of its total assets concentrated at a single base a few
miles north of Mexico City. Following the SEDENA’s
decentralization initiative and in accordance with the
Directiva para el Combate Integral al Narcotráfico 20072012, aircraft and helicopters have been deployed and
assigned directly to the regional commanders. 44
The FAM provides a clear example of an air arm almost entirely devoted to the anti-narcotic role; during
the 2006-11 time frame, it has received or placed on
order 80 aircraft and helicopters, eight of which have
been funded by the United States through the Merida
Initiative.45 Some 96 percent of these assets—including transport aircraft—have been acquired with counterdrug and organized crime as their stated primary
or secondary roles, with training focused accordingly.
The FAM has established specialized spraying and
field-spotting training centers.
FAM aircraft, equipment, procedures, technology,
and capabilities have evolved over the years, but its
organizational structure remains basically unchanged
from post-World War II, when it included a single
fighter squadron, half a dozen close-air support (CAS)
squadrons, a reconnaissance unit, a transport wing
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equipped with heavy and medium transport aircraft,
and some liaison units.
Despite this World War II era structure, the FAM
has not been immune to the global trend of introducing Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) operations. On
April 30, 2009, it began operating an unknown number
of Elbit Hermes 450 systems, and up to July 2010 their
performance was rated as satisfactory by SEDENA.46
Electronic intelligence, signals intelligence, and
airborne early warning operations are provided by an
EMBRAER EMB-145MP patrol aircraft and an EMB145SA airborne early warning (AEW) craft, and four
C-26B Metro tracker aircraft that make up the aerial
detection component of the country’s Integrated Air
Surveillance System (SIVA). SIVA, designed by SEDENA with the participation of private entities, comprises a collection of assets including air- and landbased radars. Its purpose is to detect suspicious or
illegal flights and coordinate the air, sea, or land assets
needed to intercept.
Increasing the processing capabilities of the SIVA
Command Center (CMCSIVA), expanding radar coverage, and replacing the obsolete Westinghouse TPS70 3-D radars are current priorities. Two additional
EMB-145SA AEW aircraft are required to provide adequate surveillance along the southern border.47
Transport aviation has received some attention,
including the acquisition of five C-295M medium
transports from Airbus Military to replace the Antonov An-32B transports in the 301st Squadron, and
procurement was announced of an additional five
Lockheed C-130 Hercules heavy transports to complement the 302nd Squadron. The C-295M acquisition
is of particular note, as it comprised the first use of
leasing as a procurement method. Under this scheme,
state-owned BANOBRAS public works bank acquired
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the aircraft and leased them to the FAM over a 20-year
period.
The transport helicopter fleet comprised some 44
medium lift helicopters consisting of a mix of Sikorsky CH-53, UH-60L Black Hawks, Mi-8, Mi-17s, and
AS-332 Super Pumas, plus 14 of the smaller Bell 212s
and 4 of the Bell 412s. Expansion of the fleet has not
been a priority. The U.S. Government supplied eight
Bell 412EPs from December 2009 to December 2010 as
part of the Merida Initiative to enhance the mobility
of Mexico’s forces, and the FAM ordered 12 EC725
medium helicopters in 2009 and 2010 through two
separate contracts, with deliveries scheduled to begin
in 2011. However, both types will replace older retiring Bell 212s and Mi-17s. The up-to-date technology
of the new acquisitions will lower operational costs.
The second batch of the EC725s was also underwritten by the leasing method, with BANOBRAS as the
principal financial agent. The selection of the EC725
over the UH-60 Black Hawk or Mi-17, both types with
accomplished service records in the FAM, was facilitated by offset agreements signed between the Mexican government and Eurocopter, an EADS subsidiary,
which will invest close to U.S.$550 million in a parts
assembly plant in Mexico.48
Intensifying the Counterdrug Role.
In February 2007, the FAM absorbed the aerial
eradication duties that had previously been assigned
to the Attorney General’s (PGR) Air Wing, receiving
an inventory of 50 Bell 206 helicopters configured for
aerial spraying, 8 Cessna TU206G light aircraft, MXN
50 million for their repair, 175 PGR contract personnel who were hired by the FAM, five primary bases
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of operation, and five secondary bases of operation.49
Assimilation of this large package took a little over
3 years, with the FAM also taking responsibility for
the training of its personnel as well as providing the
required maintenance to the Bell 206 fleet. By August
2010, the FAM was operating 42 of the Bell 206 helicopters in aerial spraying duties, with the other eight
undergoing repairs.50
Helicopter crew training has received priority,
with the FAM acquiring five flight simulators for the
Bell 206, Bell 412, and MD530s. In December 2010, the
FAM sent a group of 24 pilots to receive training at
the Colombian Air Force’s Helicopter Flying School at
Melgar, Colombia.51
Prior to the transfer of the PGR’s eradication duty,
the FAM had already undertaken the heavy brunt of
the counterdrug role. Six squadrons equipped with the
Cessna 182S single engine aircraft were created in the
early 2000s, serving as spotter and forward air control
(FAC) craft in support of the Army’s eradication program. In 2007, the FAM established the Cessna Pilot
Training Center (Centro de Adiestramiento para Pilotos
Aviadores de Cessna) at El Cipres airbase in Baja, California, to specialize in this type of training.52
Air Defense Needs Neglected.
Retirement of the legacy Lockheed T-33 jet trainers in
2007 has happened without a replacement, leaving air
sovereignty patrols and interceptions to a dwindling
number of Pilatus PC-7 turbo-prop armed trainers or
the single squadron of supersonic F-5E Tiger II tactical
fighters. In 2008 SEDENA sent a request to Congress
for procurement of 12 Lockheed-Martin F-16 fighters,
which would allow establishment of a second fighter
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squadron, and four batteries of air defense systems
(of an unspecified type). The request was ignored.53
A proposed avionics update for the ageing F-5E and
PC-7 fleets has also been mired in a state of uncertainty. The current national security priorities require at
least a two-tier solution that can tackle targets ranging
from very slow low-flying ultra lights to supersonic
Biz-jets. Air defense, precision strike, close air support,
and armed reconnaissance are conventional capabilities that will also need to be addressed eventually.
The Naval Ministry.
The Secretaria de Marina (SEMAR - Ministry of the
Navy) and its military service, the Armada de Mexico
(ARM - Mexican Navy), have assumed considerably
increased profiles by modernizing, transforming,
and adapting their forces to be a major partner in the
implementation of the government’s national security policy. Much like the Army, the ARM’s missions
are to provide external defense and internal security,
guarantee constitutional order (maritime law enforcement), and provide safety to the population in cases of
natural disasters and emergencies.54
In the 2006-11 time frame, SEMAR reorganized its
command structure, rebuilt its marine infantry force,
created a naval intelligence agency (UIN), reinforced
its naval aviation, and formed a network of coast
guard-style stations to enhance SAR and law enforcement presence. Attention to its ocean-going fleet is less
notable, as it has specialized in the anti-narcotic and
maritime law enforcement roles since the 1980s. From
2007, the sea, land, and air elements of SEMAR have
been separated and reorganized within a so-called
corps system, comprising a General Fleet Corps, Marine Infantry Corps, and Naval Aeronautics Corps.
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Command and Territorial Reorganization.
The previous command structure of the ARM
comprised two regional headquarters (HQs), one on
each coast, which controlled all surface, air, and land
forces assigned to it and reported to SEMAR HQ. This
organization was revamped with the regional HQs
deleted. A single General HQ is based in Mexico City,
overseeing all naval operations. This command restructure, which follows a political-strategic character, has the
specific intention of generating better efficiency in the navy’s participation against organized crime and insecurity.55
SEMAR’s territorial organization follows a model
comprising a Naval Region/Naval Zone/Naval Sector pattern that mirrors the Army’s Military Region/
Military Zone/Garrison pattern. Each naval region
controls a flotilla of varying size. These are separated
into destroyer (including destroyers and frigates) and
auxiliary flotillas. The seven regions are divided into
13 Naval Zones and 14 Naval Sectors.
The Green Water Fleet.56
The main seagoing fleet is spearheaded by four
1970s-vintage Allende-class (ex-U.S. Navy Knox) frigates delivered between 1997 and 2002. These ships are
the most powerful sea going vessels in service and are
complemented by two more Bravo-class (ex-U.S. Bronstein-class) frigates and an ageing Quetzalcoatl-class
(ex-U.S. Gearing) destroyer that dates from World War
II. Another World War II-era ship, the destroyer escort
Manuel Azueta (ex-U.S. Edsall), continues in service although it is designated for training; commissioned in
1945 and 1943 respectively, the last two operational
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destroyers will need to be withdrawn shortly as increased maintenance costs make them burdens. Replacement with destroyer-size ships is unlikely under
current budget allocations and requirements. This
type of transformation follows a global tendency to
shift from the larger power-projection ships to smaller, faster, multi-purpose vessels.
The amphibious warfare fleet is composed of two
Papaloapan-class (ex-U.S. Newport) landing ship-tanks
(LST) that were delivered in 2000 and 2001. At 5,200tons, these are the largest ships in the fleet and have
deployed in humanitarian assistance missions to foreign countries including the United States (Hurricane
Katrina in 2005), the tsunami in Indonesia (2005), and
major storm disasters in Haiti (2008, 2010). They are
complemented by a pair of locally designed auxiliary
support ships and a single Panuco (ex-U.S. LST-1152)
which will be replaced soon (it was first commissioned
in 1945) by a pair of 3,300-ton logistics support ships
being built at Mexican shipyards, with construction
having started in January 2010 and delivery expected
in 2012-13.57
The Patrol Force Fleet comprises 31 ocean patrol
vessels (OPV) and over 80 interceptor craft, the majority of which have been built in Mexican shipyards.
Indigenous design and development of OPVs started
in the late 1980s based on experience with the six
Halcon-class corvettes acquired from Spain. From that
point on, the anti-narcotic and maritime law enforcement role became the driving force in ship design and
operational requirements.
The most recent indigenous development is the
Oaxaca-class OPV, a 1,680-ton vessel, similar in size to a
USCG 270-ft medium endurance cutter. It is equipped
with an AS-565MB Panther helicopter and two fast in-
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terceptor crafts, making it an ideal platform for antinarcotic operations. There are four Oaxacas in service
and two more under construction; they have been preceded by the 1,554-ton Durango-class vessel (delivered
2000-01), 1,200-ton Sierra-class (delivered 1999-2000),
and 1,290-ton Holzinger-class (1991-94). Ten Auk-class
ex-minesweepers modified as patrol vessels also need
to be replaced shortly as these have been in service
with the Mexican Navy since 1973, having been originally commissioned in the U.S. Navy between 1942
and 1945.58
Since drug trafficking organizations concentrated
on the use of fast boats in the late 1980s and 1990s,
which could easily outturn and outrun the larger and
older OPV and coastal patrol vessels, the ARM adapted. All of its OPVs are helicopter-equipped, either
from scratch or as modified with platforms. The use
of helicopters to spot and pursue targets at sea developed into the Trinomio tactic, which includes the use
of an OPV, an air asset, and a fast interceptor craft.
The need for additional fast interceptors was evident, and in 2000 the Mexican Government signed a
deal with the Swedish shipyard Dockstavarvet for the
procurement of 40 Combat Boat CB90HMN interceptor craft capable of speeds well over 45 knots.59 The
agreement also included assembly of the craft in Mexico with follow-on requirements of at least 100 more
of these boats in service. Sixteen were built locally by
2006 before production shifted to the faster Interceptor craft IC16M, which has speeds of over 50 knots.60
The requirement for the 100-interceptor craft fleet was
scaled back by the current administration to 17.
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Building a Coast Guard Network.
In order to enhance its search and rescue (SAR) capabilities, SEMAR launched the Sistema de Busqueda
y Rescate (SAR System) consisting of 17 SAR naval
stations (ENSAR) throughout the coastal region. Five
of these are categorized as ENSAR-A, comprising
two Safe Boat Defender-class patrol boats, a Marine
Textron MLB unsinkable patrol boat, and an MD902
helicopter. The remainder, categorized as ENSAR-B,
are equipped with two Defenders each. The first ENSAR began operations during April 2007, and 12 were
in operation by early 2011. In addition to their stated
SAR role, these stations provide an enhanced law enforcement presence.
Marine Corps Revival.
The most demanding task for the current SEMAR
administration has been the reestablishment of an adequate marine infantry force. The previous SEMAR
administrations halved the 11,000-strong marine force,
transferring 5,000 marines to the newly created Federal Preventive Police (PFP) between 1999 and 2006.61
In December 2006, the then new Secretary of the Navy
was instructed to transfer another 2,500 naval personnel to support the PFP. By March 2007, it was clear
that naval personnel would not voluntarily transfer to
the PFP. The SEMAR leadership therefore offered an
alternative to PFP: raise its own military forces that
would be capable of implementing the maritime police role.62
At the time, the Marine Corps consisted of two
amphibious force groups (one on each coast), trained
and equipped for amphibious landings, and two ma-
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rine infantry battalions (one airborne, one presidential
guard) based in Mexico City. The challenge was to create a force of 30 marine infantry battalions that would
be permanently based in the coastal states and provide
internal security (protection of strategic installations;
combating traffic of narcotics, people, and weapons;
search and rescue; and maritime route security). Manpower allocations for Marine infantry battalions were
also raised from a previously depleted level of around
400 to the 650-680 mark, making the Mexican Marine
Infantry Corps second in number only to that of the
United States. Since the main task to be performed
by these 30 battalions was anti-organized crime, the
equipment procured for them included logistic vehicles such as pickup trucks and troop carriers, infantry
weapons, and communications equipment.
Along with the Marine Corps expansion, a third
special forces unit was based in Mexico City during
2008. These special forces are mainly drawn from
marines and are being organized into a Marine Infantry Special Operations Brigade, with detachments
throughout the country. Their close relationship with
the UIN, which itself was formed during 2008, have
made them the main reaction forces employed in hunting down cartel leaders, even in land-locked places
such as Mexico City, Cuernavaca, and Monterrey.
The UIN possesses advanced collection and analytical
capabilities and is regarded as the most efficient and
collaborative Mexican intelligence agency by foreign
intelligence services.
Transformation of Naval Aviation Requirements.
A radical shift in naval aviation planning saw the
decision to exchange a requirement for 12 jet fighters
to a requirement for a fleet of 15 turbo-prop maritime
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surveillance aircraft. SEMAR, which already possessed
eight C-212PM maritime patrol aircraft, selected the
CN-235MP offered by EADS-CASA (now known as
Airbus Military). Commonality with the C-212 (also
an Airbus Military product) and with the U.S. Coast
Guard’s HC-144 ocean sentry (the USCG designation of its CN-235MPs) was a factor. The SEMAR and
USCG versions are not identical, differing in their mission control packages.
Air transport requirements for naval aviation foresee an increase from the capability to ferry 5,816 troops
and 224 tons of cargo in 2009, to 19,252 and 1,197 tons
by 2012. This will require increasing the transport aircraft fleet from 6 to 17.63 So far, four C-295M medium
transports have been acquired to complement the four
Ukrainian-built An-32B medium transports procured
in the mid 1990s. The last two C-295Ms were acquired
through a leasing agreement with state development
bank BANOBRAS. The acquisition of these aircraft
was justified on the same basis: increased efficiency
in aeronautical operations in military transport and
cargo activities such as protecting human life at sea;
combating illegal traffic of narcotics, people, and
weapons; and assisting the population in case of disasters and emergencies.64
The ARM has also pioneered the use of indigenous
unmanned aerial systems (UAS). Furthermore, the
SEMAR research and development institute began its
own UAS project during 2010. The first UAS unit was
to have been set up in 2010 with the indigenously developed S4 Ehectal (God of the Wind) tactical UAV,
E1 Gavilan mini-UAV, and mobile ground control centers in the state of Tamaulipas.65 Its implementation
appears to have been delayed, but the beginning of
UAS operations in support of marine counternarcotic
operations is imminent.
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Naval Procurement, Assistance, and Cooperation.
Over the 2006-11 period, the Navy has received
over U.S.$ 808 million worth of equipment comprising four Oaxaca-class ocean patrol vessels, nine IC16M
interceptor craft (known as Polaris II), 34 Safe Boat
Defender coastal patrol boats, and six unsinkable
Textron MLB motor life boats; aviation assets have
included three AS-565MB Panther multi-mission helicopters, one Kazan Mi-17V-5 medium-lift helicopter,
one S4 Ehectal UAS, four CN-235MP maritime patrol
aircraft, four C-295M medium transport aircraft, and
one Gulfstream VIP aircraft; and land vehicles, mainly
for the marines, have included 164 Unimog 4000 troop
carriers, 84 Mercedes G-class and 22 Land Rover Defender 130 light armored vehicles.
During the same period, the United States has announced transfers of four additional CN-235MP Persuader maritime patrol aircraft worth U.S.$210 million;
and three UH-60M Black Hawk medium-lift helicopters
worth U.S. $71 million. No deliveries of any of these
were reported as of February 2011.
Conclusion.
The campaign against organized crime, particularly narco-trafficking and arms smuggling, has been
the main driver in the modernization of Mexico’s
armed forces. The need to rely on the armed forces as
the lead instrument in implementing the national security policy is a reflection of historical neglect, which
long precedes the current administration, of developing capable and democratic law enforcement institutions. Although federal police institutions have been
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considerably expanded in manpower and capabilities
during the past 5 years, they still lack the institutional
depth—experience and continuity—to take on a principal role.
The main challenges to the Mexican military in the
21st century will be:
•	To remain an apolitical force, which currently
can be achieved only by being directly subordinate to the executive and increasingly accountable through the legislature to the bicameral
Commission on National Security, as well as
the National Defense and Navy Commissions.
•	To continue to be a purely professional and
volunteer-based force, striving towards specialization by forming dedicated agencies and
mission-specific units.
•	To prioritize respect of human rights and the
rule of law in order to maintain the military’s
legitimacy. This priority needs not only to be
clarified, but to be communicated, both domestically and abroad.
•	To remain a credible defense force by assimilating new technology and specializing so as to
address the changing nature of threats. Cyber
defense, information operations, and underwater warfare are also areas currently in need of
attention. Finally, airpower needs to be modernized and expanded considerably, especially
regarding air mobility, ISR, and sovereignty
control capabilities.
•	To cooperate and coordinate (C&C) with national and international agencies—military and
civilian. C&C needs to be mission- or purposespecific, with specifically defined boundaries
and responsibilities. C&C needs to be expand-

34

ed and enhanced considerably, especially with
the main partners in the area: the United States,
Guatemala, Belize, Colombia, El Salvador, and
Honduras.
•	To strengthen defense diplomacy. C&C requires effective negotiation by the corresponding diplomatic authorities. Participation in
international peacekeeping and humanitarian
relief operations—be they regional, multilateral, or binational—is entirely a political decision.
The military, however, needs to be involved in
the decisionmaking process to assure that the
proper capabilities are in place to implement
said policy.
•	To create a civilian career service. The Mexican
armed forces, despite nominal increases in salaries and benefits over the past 5 years, remain
considerably underfunded and undermanned.
Opening up civil service careers would lessen
the strain on manpower resources as well as the
cost of militarizing all members of the defense
institutions. This would make the institutions
more efficient and help provide a precedent
and model on how to implement a professional
career service in Mexican Government institutions. The professional career path is currently
present only in the armed forces and foreign
service.
Counterdrug and law enforcement operations
ideally should be performed by capable and accountable civilian institutions. However, these are not yet
in place. Institutions and communities need to be
strengthened at the economic, judicial, educational,
and cultural levels. These deep transformations will
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require decades of effort before they produce measurable effects. As of 2011, the Mexican armed forces
remain the most valued and trusted forces in place to
implement the national security policy, and to provide
models for the type of stable and long-term institutions Mexico requires.
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